










Income Risk, Saving and Taxation: 
























An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded from the Ifo website 
www.cesifo-group.de. 
Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Ifo Working Paper No. 125 
Income Risk, Saving and Taxation: 
Will Precautionary Saving Survive? 
Abstract 
 
Former theoretical and empirical studies find that precautionary savings are reduced in 
the presence of social security systems. The saving motive, however, does not change: 
individuals respond to increasing income risk by increasing their savings. Although this 
still holds for common tax and transfer systems, we show that this is not a feature of all 
tax and transfers systems. In contrast to former studies, we focus on the impact of the 
variability of future income (higher degree risk). 
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1  Introduction 
Since the late 1950s, economists argue that economic agents prefer smooth consumption paths 
over their life-cycle and therefore aim to shift consumption between periods via saving. In the 
presence of uncertain future income, individuals additionally aim to insure themselves against 
future labor income risk [see Leland (1968) or Levhari and Srinivasan (1969)]. Risk averse 
individuals  have  to  conceive  a  strategy  to  attenuate  the  realization  of  low  incomes.  In  a 
laissez-faire economy, there is no other option than to save income for future periods to avoid 
very low levels of income. This is referred to as “precautionary savings”. In a welfare state, 
different aspects of the tax and transfer system (marginal tax rates, level of unemployment 
insurance, etc.) are likely to substitute individual savings. 
The  impact  of  unemployment  insurance  on  precautionary  savings  has  been  part  of  the 
economic literature since the late 1970s [e.g., Flemming (1978)]. From a theoretical point of 
view, more recent studies identify that unemployment insurance crowds out precautionary 
savings [e.g. Hubbard et al. (1995), Engen and Gruber (2001)]. Based on their theoretical 
model,  Engen  and  Gruber  (2001)  evaluate  the  model’s  predictions  empirically.  They  use 
differences in unemployment insurance systems across US states to estimate the impact of 
unemployment insurance on savings. Their results suggest that a reduction of unemployment 
benefits leads to an increase in the savings of individuals. Furthermore, the crowding-out 
effect of unemployment insurance on savings is greater the higher the unemployment risk. 
Although  the  results  of  former  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  show  that  precautionary 
savings  are  reduced  by  social  security  systems,  the  saving  motive  itself  remains  intact. 
Savings still increase with labor income risk. However, this increase is either implicitly or 
explicitly based on a shift in expected total income. Following the nomenclature of Eeckhoudt 
and Schlesinger (2008), we define this shift as an increase in first degree income risk. More 
general, an increasing income risk is defined as any change in the distribution of future labor 2 
 
income. If the mean is kept constant, i.e. only higher degrees of income risk are considered, 
this will be referred to as a change of the variability of labor income. Whenever the focus is 
on  the  variability  of  income  only,  the  question  arises  whether  the  presence  of  taxes  and 
transfers not only crowds out, but even overrides the precautionary savings motive. 
In this paper we address the impact of a tax and transfer system theoretically by using a 
stochastic dominance approach. In contrast to mean-variance analysis this method eases the 
comparative statics [Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971)], allowing us to obtain easily interpretable 
results.
1 We introduce  a tax and transfer system  into the risk-savings model developed by 
Gunning (2010). Within this model we analyze the effect of the tax and transfer system on the 
response of savings to a change in income risk. The results depend on the design of the tax 
and transfer system. T here is a wide range of designs that will  not override  the  savings 
motive. Only in some cases does the specific design of the tax and transfer system have the 
potential to induce decreasing savings when the variability of future labor income rises.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we  briefly summarize the 
theoretical model by Gunning (2010). Section 3 describes our extension  to  this model, 
presents the results and discuss es our findings with focus on the institutional  framework. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2  Gunning’s Model 
The risk-savings model by Gunning (2010) distinguishes four types of risk: wealth risk, asset 
risk, capital income risk and labor income risk. The model is designed to analyze the effect of 
an increasing risk in any of these four types of risks on the saving behavior of economic 
                                                           
1 In the literature both approaches are used to analyze risk and uncertainty for various economic issues. For a 
comparison see e.g. Yitzhaki (1982). 3 
 
agents. For the aim of our paper, it is sufficient to summarize the basic framework for labor 
income risk only. 
In the model an economic agent maximizes lifetime utility ( ) over two periods. The utility 
function of the agent is characterized by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), is concave 
and time-additive. The first-period income is certain and the second-period labor income is 
stochastic. In the first period, the agent consumes a fraction of his given financial wealth   
and transfers the rest into the second period by saving an amount   (          ).
2 The agent 
maximizes expected lifetime utility with respect to savings  : 
                            .              (1) 
The instantaneous utility      in the first period is determined by first-period consumption. 
Expected utility in the second period is discounted by the time preference parameter   and 
depends  on  second-period  consumption  (  ).  Assuming  secure  capital  assets  (no 
depreciation), second-period consumption can be written as 
                                                         .      (2) 
Second-period consumption is determined by the mean labor income  , savings  , the interest 
rate   ,  and  an  exogenous  stochastic  income  shock     which  is  drawn  from  a  known 
distribution. The shock has an expected value of unity and is only defined for positive values 
(              ). Savings and the interest from savings increase second-period consumption. 
Maximization of lifetime utility gives the well-known Euler condition: 
                   
   
   .                (3) 
With the help of equation (3) one can investigate the impact of an increasing risk on savings.  
                                                           
2 Debt is excluded, as the borrowing constraint is binding, so that no debt exists at the end of the second period 
[Gunning (2010), Engen and Gruber (2001) and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008)]. The random second-period 
income does not necessarily guarantee sufficient funds to pay first-period debt. 4 
 
From the right-hand side of equation (3), the term in brackets will be defined as a function of 
 ,               
   
  . Then, from Jensen’s inequality, it can be shown that if      is strictly 
convex  in   ,  a  mean-preserving  spread  in  the  distribution  of     will  increase  savings 
[Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971)].
3 Figure 1 illustrates that mechanism in an example with a 
simplified two-point distribution of   (        ). 
Figure 1: Effect of an increase in second-order risk 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
Figure 1 depicts marginal second-period utility of savings      as a function of second-period 
consumption. Higher second-period consumption is associated with a lower marginal utility 
of saving, thus, the function must be decreasing. The points    and    depict an arbitrary 
two-point  distribution  with  probability  mass  of  one  half  in  each  point.  Thus,  expected 
                                                           
3 Consider an individual who aims to maximize her expected utility, 
                   . 
The variable   is random and   is the control variable the individual chooses to maximize utility. The optimal   
must satisfy               . If   is monotonically decreasing in   and         is a convex function of  , an 
increase in risk (increase in the variability of  ) will raise           . Hence,      will increase as well. 
     
  
   
   
   
   5 
 
consumption  will  be  in  the  middle  of  the  dashed  line  connecting      and    .  A  mean-
preserving  spread  that  leaves  the  probability  masses  unchanged  now  shifts  the  points 
outwards  to      and    ,  respectively.  The  dashed  line  that  connects  these  points  shifts 
upwards. The vertical dotted line marks expected second-period consumption, the horizontal 
ones expected marginal utility. Thus, with convex marginal utility (as shown in Figure 1) a 
mean-preserving spread in the distribution of   increases c. p. the expected marginal utility of 
consumption. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the right-hand side of equation (3). In order 
for the Euler condition to hold, the savings   need to be adjusted. An increase in   will 
increase the left-hand side and decrease the right-hand side decreased. Thus, in order for the 
Euler condition to be met again, savings must rise. 
Gunning (2010) shows that for the case of labor income risk,      is always strictly convex in 
the shock  . Thus, increasing variability of labor income (an increase in higher degree risk) 
always increases savings. This result complies with the empirical findings mentioned above. 
 
3  Extending Gunning’s Model 
Taxes  and  transfers  scale  second-period  consumption,  since  they  do  not  affect  income 
ordering. Thus, when introducing taxes and transfers to Gunning’s model, one might assume 
that the result of increasing savings in the presence of higher risk continues to hold. Therefore 
a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of   should still cause an increase in second-
period income risk. To  examine in detail the impact of a tax and  transfer system on the 
savings decision we modify Gunning’s (2010) model by adding a tax term   to second-period 
consumption.
4 Moreover, we set the average second -period labor income    equal to unity 
                                                           
4 Taxes and transfers cannot be transferred between both periods. Thus, first-period taxes and transfers can be 
neglected and the financial wealth of the first period is given as a net value. 6 
 
which enables us to interpret the stochastic parameter   as the stochastic gross labor income. 
Second-period consumption defined in equation (2) is thus changed to 
                                 .        (4) 
The tax   is a function of second-period gross labor income   and the interest-bearing savings 
        . The expected tax burden faced by an individual is assumed to be positive and not 
affected by a spread in the labor income distribution.
5 Depending on  the savings and the 
realization of  , the individual tax burden might become negative. Hence, equation (4) also 
includes the possibility of low income households receiving transfers. This kind of modeling 
provides several advantages. First, it allows the derivation of an expression for the marginal 
utility  of  savings,      .  This  expression  can  be  used  to  evaluate  the  second  order 
characteristics without further mathematical complexity. Second, the definition of the tax and 
transfer system is very flexible. It easily captures many different regimes. Finally, the general 
definition of the tax term eases the formal analysis and discussion. 
One  drawback  of  our  notion  of  a  negative  tax  is  that  it  describes  only  top-up  benefits. 
Including a case in which a worker does not work as soon as the second-period labor income 
falls below a certain threshold would require a non-continuous consumption function. This 
would prevent a global characterization of the convexity. 
As  in  Gunning  (2010),  precautionary  savings  increase  with  an  increase  in  variability, 
whenever the function      is convex in  . The modification of second-period consumption 
to a nonlinear function of   does not affect the mathematical implications [see Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970, 1971)]. The second derivative of      with respect to   is given by: 
                                                           
5  Under  this  assumption,  a  mean-preserving  spread  in     leaves  the  mean  of  second-period  consumption 
unchanged. Thus, we can analyze the impact of an increasing variability of future labor income by excluding 
first-order risk (mean variation). When all public transfers are included, the expectation of the net tax-payer is 
zero. A necessary requirement for this assumption is an immediate adaption of the tax system. While not altering 
the regime, levels have to be adjusted, such that agents in some higher income quantiles received transfers before 
the spread, but have to pay taxes after the spread. 7 
 
                  
                                .       (5) 
In equation (5),        and      denote the first, second and third derivatives of the second-
period utility function with respect to second-period consumption. The variables    and    
denote the first derivative of second-period consumption with respect to savings   and gross 
wage   ,  respectively.  Furthermore,       denotes  the  second  derivative  of  second-period 
consumption  with  respect  to  gross  wage   .    The  cross  derivative  of  second-period 
consumption with respect to savings and gross wage is given by    . Finally,      represents 
the derivative of     with respect to the gross wage.  
Strict  convexity  of        is  given  if  and  only  if  equation  (5)  is  positive  (          ). 
Rearranging the inequality            and substituting gives the following proposition. 
 
Proposition. The precautionary savings motive survives (i.e. a mean-preserving spread in the 
distribution of gross labor income will increase savings) in the presence of a tax and transfer 
system if and only if 
 
    
       
   
           
   
              
 
  
   
    
    
                      (6) 
for all possible realizations of gross labor income     and a given choice of savings    . 
 
Proof. If inequality (6) holds then it follows immediately that the marginal utility of savings 
     is convex in gross labor income  . Thus savings must increase in response to an increase 
in variability of gross labor income [see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971)].          □ 
 8 
 
Using a CRRA utility function,     is negative, while the third derivative is positive. Hence, 
the left-hand side (LHS) of inequality (6) is positive. The LHS of inequality (6) represents the 
index of absolute prudence [see Kimball (1990)]. Higher prudence implies that an individual 
saves  more  for  a  given  income  risk.  Mazzocco  (2004)  points  out  that  the  coefficient  of 
absolute prudence measures the convexity of marginal utility [Mazzocco (2004) p. 1171].  
The right-hand side (RHS) of inequality (6) consists of three terms describing the properties 
of the tax and transfer system. The variable    denotes the marginal labor income tax rate and 
    represents the progression of labor income tax.
6 Analogously,    is the marginal capital 
(savings) tax rate and     describes how an additional unit of capital affects the marginal 
labor income tax rate
 (and vice versa).
7 Finally,      describes how the labor income tax 
progression / degression changes if savings change. The third term on the RHS of inequality 
(6) contains the inverse of the measure of absolute risk aversion    
   
   . The higher this 
index, the higher is the risk aversion. As the first derivative of the utility function is positive, 
the inverse of the measure of absolute risk aversion is positive as well. 
As  the  LHS of  condition  (6) is  positive, the inequality is  always  satisfied if the  RHS  is 
negative. However, in the case of RHS >  , it is possible that RHS > LHS for at least some 
 .This implies that the effect of an increasing risk on savings is ambiguous.  
With the help of inequality (6), we can now derive specifications of the tax and transfer 
system that may override the precautionary savings motive. The level of taxes or transfers 
does not enter inequality (6) explicitly and therefore cannot induce concavity of      on its 
own. However, it enters inequality (6) via its impact on consumption and therefore via the 
first, second and third derivatives of the utility function. 
                                                           
6 If     is negative, labor income tax is degressive. 
7 The capital tax can also be rearranged to a capital income tax.  9 
 
For simplicity, we take the level of the tax or transfer as given (the LHS of (6) remains 
constant), which allows us to focus on the RHS only. Additionally, in order to restrict the 
discussion to plausible regimes, we consider only marginal tax rates for capital and for labor 
income  that  are  positive  and  below  unity.  All  denominators  on  the  RHS  of  (6)  are  thus 
positive and less than unity. The higher these tax rates are (closer to unity), the larger is the 
impact of the remaining characteristics of the tax system. 
Income tax progression i.e.         will never jeopardize the inequality in (6) alone. Income 
tax degression, however, may induce concavity of      for some realizations of labor income 
and therefore may invert the precautionary savings motive. Formally, a negative     makes 
the first term in (6),  
   
       , positive. Figure 2 illustrates such a function that is partially 
concave.  
Figure 2: Partially concave marginal utility 
 Source: Authors’ illustration. 
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The solid line depicts a possible marginal utility curve under degressive income taxation. 
Assuming all other parameters are  fixed, the function      is now concave for a certain 
domain of  . This implies that the effect of an increase in risk on savings is not necessarily 
positive. This is easily understood if the same exercise as in Figure 1 is repeated. The points 
   and    represent an arbitrary two point distribution with probability one half each.  A 
mean-preserving spread shifts these points outwards to    and   , respectively. The expected 
second-period consumption and marginal utility is at the half of the dashed lines. The dashed 
lines now intersect, with the expected marginal utility in period 2 being lower after the spread. 
For this simple example, an increase in expected marginal utility, even if some realizations 
are in the domain of   in which      is convex, cannot be guaranteed. 
An analogous effect may be observed if the marginal capital tax negatively depends on gross 
labor income (       ), i.e. capital taxation increases as gross labor income declines.
8 The 
same holds true for a marginal labor income tax  if the marginal labor income tax depends 
negatively on the stock of private assets (       ; capital-income-tax-responsiveness). In both 
cases the second term of the RHS of inequality (6),   
   
            , becomes positive. Finally, 
if the progression / degression of labor income taxation increases with higher capital holdings, 
i.e.         , precautionary savings may be eliminated as well. Intuitively, whenever higher 
savings increase the labor income tax rate, the effect of risk on saving must be ambiguous in 
some settings.  The positive effect  of  precautionary  savings  in  a high risk  environment  is 
mitigated by the negative effect of savings on the tax burden. If the negative impact on the tax 
                                                           
8 An example for this case is the German labor market legislation and labor income taxation for individuals who 
earn wages below the top-up benefit threshold. The top-up benefit is means-tested, thus the stock of private 
assets (savings) affects the size of the top-up benefit. Assume that an individual of this group is endowed with a 
low stock of savings and realizes a low second-period income. Thus, the overall second-period consumption is 
close  to  the  publicly  guaranteed  minimum  consumption  level.  For  very  low  incomes,  any  additional  labor 
income or private asset reduces the transfer almost one to one. A person can only get a top-up benefit if the 
private savings do not exceed a specific amount, which implies a negative    . 11 
 
burden outweighs the insurance function of savings, the precautionary savings motive may be 
lost. 
However, there is no regime for which inequality (6) is reversed for all  . This would imply 
the strict concavity of      over the whole domain of  , which is excluded by          and 
          for all  . In contrast there are regimes in which inequality (6) holds over the whole 
domain of  . For each combination of a flat or progressive labor income tax (       ) and a 
capital tax rate that is independent of or increasing in gross labor income (       ),      is 
convex in the stochastic parameter   for all possible values of  .
9 Thus, under tax and transfer 
regimes common in many industrialized countries, a mean-preserving spread in future labor 
income induces an increase in savings, implying that these  tax and transfer  systems do not 
undermine the precautionary savings motive. 
 
4  Conclusion 
This paper considers the response of precautionary saving to changes in labor income risk in 
the presence of a tax and transfer system. Previous theoretical research has established that a 
public transfer, which guarantees a minimum consumption (income), has an unambiguously 
negative impact on precautionary savings, but leaves the precautionary savings motive itself 
untouched. However, these papers focus on an increase in first degree risk (i.e. a change of 
the mean income). We examine whether their result also holds for a rise in higher degree risk 
(i.e.  in  the  variability  of  labor  income).  Our  analysis  is  based  on  the  risk-savings  model 
presented by Gunning (2010) which we augment by a tax and transfer term capable of flexibly 
capturing different regimes. Our results suggest that in most cases the precautionary savings 
motive remains intact. There are, however, tax regimes that may eliminate the precautionary 
                                                           
9 This holds true if the labor income tax progression is independent of, or increasing in, the savings;         . 12 
 
savings motive. At the margin, the following features enhance the probability of such a result: 
labor income tax degression, a less favorable interaction of labor income and marginal capital 
tax  (capital-income-tax-responsiveness)  as  well  as  an  increasing  income  tax 
progression / degression  with higher savings  (responsiveness to progression). The level  of 
taxes and transfers only matters by shifting the relative importance of these characteristics. 
The most common real-world tax and transfer systems do not exhibit most of those features 
and hence the precautionary savings motive survives. 
   13 
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